Machine learning presents a general, systematic framework for the generation of formal theoretical models for physical description and prediction. Tentatively standard linear modeling techniques are reviewed; followed by a brief discussion of generalizations to deep forward networks for approximating nonlinear phenomena.
I. ALGORITHMIC INDUCTION
There appear to be at least two approaches to induction. The first route is by intuition and ingenuity. It has been successfully pursued by geniuses and gifted individuals. A typical representative of this approach to knowledge is Ramanujan who seemed to have attributed his revelations to a Hindu Goddess [1] . In western thought, this is often more secularly referred to as Platonism. Gödel seemed to have held the opinion that our minds have access to truth, which can be discovered through personal insights -maybe even beyond the bounds of universal computability -in particular, that minds are not (Turing) machines [2, p. 216] . As successful these narratives may have been, they remain anecdotal and cannot be generalized.
When it comes to ad hoc revelations of individuals, there may also be psychological issues. These have been described by Freud [3] , pointing to the dangers caused by "temptations to project, what [the analyst] in dull self-perception recognizes as the peculiarities of his own personality, as generally valid theory into science." A similar warning comes from Jaynes' warning against the "Mind Projection Fallacy" [4, 5] , pointing out that "we are all under an ego-driven temptation to project our private thoughts out onto the real world, by supposing that the creations of one's own imagination are real properties of Nature, or that one's own ignorance signifies some kind of indecision on the part of Nature.
A second approach could be conceived in the spirit of Turing [6] . In this line of thought, it is possible to obtain knowledge about a system by mechanical, algorithmic procedures; such as a deterministic agent "provided with paper, pencil and rubber, and subject to strict discipline [carrying out a set of rules of procedure written down]" [7, * alexander.svozil@gmail.com † svozil@tuwien.ac.at; http://tph.tuwien.ac.at/˜svozil p. 34]. Recently one of the more promising approaches to algorithmic induction has been machine learning [8] .
Two caveats should be stated upfront. First, the general induction problem is unsolvable with respect and relative to universal computational capacities [9] [10] [11] [12] . So, in certain (even constructible) situations machine learning, like all other algorithmic induction strategies, provably fails. But that does not exclude heuristic methods of induction, such as machine learning applied to physical phenomena. Second, theoretical constructions cannot be expected to faithfully represent the "laws underlying" a phenomenology. As Lakatos [13] points out, the progressiveness and degeneracy of research programs are transient. In this approach the "explanations" and theoretical models generated by machine learning present knowledge and explanations which cannot claim to have any ontological, only epistemic, relevance -they are means relative to the methods employed.
Whereas machine learning has already been applied to very specific problems in high energy [14] and solid state physics [15] , we would like to propose it as a very general method of theory formation and induction.
II. LINEAR MODELS OF INERTIAL MOTION
In what follows a linear regression model [8, Sect. 5.1.4] will be used. Thereby we shall, if not stated explicitly otherwise, closely follow the notation of Mermin's book on Quantum Computer Science [16] .
Suppose, for the sake of demonstration, a onedimensional physical system of a particle in inertial motion. Suppose further that it has been (approximately) measured already at n ≥ 2 positions x 1 , . . . , x n at times t 1 , . . . , t n , respectively. The goal is to find a general algorithm which could predict where its location at an arbitrary time τ .
In what follows the respective positions and times are (not necessarily successively) arranged as n-tuples; that is, as a finite ordered list of elements, and interpreted as
whereby the superscript ⊺ indicates transposition, and i 1 , . . . , i n are arbitrary permutations of 1, . . . , n. That is, it is not necessary to order the events temporally; actually they can "run backwards" or be randomly arranged [17] .
A linear regression Ansatz is to find a linear model for the prediction of some unknown observable, given some anecdotal instances of its performance. More formally, let y be an arbitrary observable, which depends on n parameters x 1 , . . . , x n by linear means, that is, by
where x| = (|x ) ⊺ is the transpose of the vector |x , the tuple
contains the unknown weights of the approximationthe "theory," if you like -and a|b = i a i b i stands for the Euclidean scalar product of the tuples interpreted as (dual) vectors in n-dimensional (dual) vector space R n .
Given are m known instances of (2); that is, m pairs z j , |x j are known. These data can be bundled into an m-tuple
and an (m × n)-matrix
where j 1 , . . . , j m are arbitrary permutations of 1, . . . , m, and the matrix rows are just the vectors |x
The task is to compute a "good" estimate of |r ; that is, an estimate of |r which allows an "optimal" computation of the prediction y.
Suppose that a good way to measure the performance of the prediction from some particular definite but unknown |r with respect to the m given data z j , |x j is by the mean squared error (MSE)
In order to minimize the mean squared error (6) with respect to variations of |r one obtains a condition for "the linear theory" |y by setting its derivatives (its gradient) to zero; that is
A lengthy but straightforward computation yields
and finally, upon multiplication with (X ⊺ X) −1 from the left,
A short plausibility check for n = m = 1 yields the linear dependency |z = X|r . Coming back to the one-dimensional physical system of a particle in inertial motion, we could characterize inertial motion in machine learning and linear regression terms by the requirement that the Ansatz (2) is "good" in the sense that predictions can be made to a "sufficient degree" (a term which is arbitrary, subjective and thus conventional); that is, within a pre-defined error.
If the particle does not pass through the origin, it might be necessary to augment Eq. (2) with an affine term b, which can be absorbed into |x ′ = x 1 , . . . , x n , 1 ⊺ and |r ′ = r 1 , . . . , r n , b ⊺ such that
III. NONLINEAR MODELS OF NONINERTIAL MOTION
The linear Ansatz (2) fails for noninertial motion. One possible way to cope with nonlinearities would be to introduce extra dimensions corresponding to nonlinear terms, such as x l for 2 ≤ l ≤ d < ∞; with the consequence that the dimensionality of the parameter space increases.
In order to cope with nonlinear phenomena, deep forward networks have been used in machine learning [8, Chapt. 6] . This strategy of deep learning invokes intermediate hidden theoretical layers of description which communicate with each other. For the sake of an example, suppose there are two functions g and h, connected in a chain by functional substitution, such that f (x) = h (g(x) ). The length of the chain is identified with the depth of the model -in this case two. g is the first layer of the model. The final layer -in this case his called the output layer.
Unfortunately, the linear regression Ansatz (10) for g and h would effectively be linear again. Therefore, in order to model a nonlinear phenomenology, a nonlinear Ansatz for at least one layer. Such networks are capable of approximating any Borel measurable function (and its derivative, even if it a generalized function) from one finite dimensional space to another [18] [19] [20] .
However, it could be suspected that, despite the fact that this approximation is "good," the task of finding such an approximation might not be constructive. Indeed, because if such a learning would be computable as it may imply the (approximate) "solution" of the general rule inference problem [9] [10] [11] [12] , which it turn can be reduced to the halting problem of universal computers. This is not dissimilar to solutions of the n-body problem [21] , which, if the system encodes a universal computer, turn out to be uncomputable [22] .
IV. DISCUSSION
One objection for applying machine learning algorithms to physical theory creation might be that it lacks "meaning;" that is, that it amounts to pure syntax devoid of any semantics. If the semantics is omitted, there can be no true "understanding" of the "physics behind" the phenomena.
One may counter this criticism by noticing that, first, underlying such objections is the premise that there actually is something to be discovered or revealed. This realistic ontology is by far nontrivial, and is heavily debated [23] . If, for example, the phenomena emerge from primordial chaos, such as in Greek mythology and cosmology, χάος, then any "meaning" one might present and "discover" ultimately remains a (pragmative) narrative, or a mathematical abstraction such as Ramsey theory at best: for any data, there cannot be no correlationsregardless of the origin or type of empirical data, there always has to be some, maybe spurious [24] , regularity or coincidences or properties. How can it be excluded that the laws of physics are nothing but yet undiscovered consequences of Ramsey theory?
Second, as has already been pointed out, historic evidence seems to suggest that successive physical models (say, of gravity) are not continuously evolving; but that they are disruptive and dissimilar [13, 25] . One may even go so far as to suggest that, in any case, theories are (more or less [26] ) successful believe systems; very much like Greek mythology [27] .
Third, also the present perception of the quantum mechanical formalism includes, among other inclinations, the position that no interpretation is necessary [28] ; that indeed, interpretation is even dangerous and detremental for the researcher [29, p. 129] ; or that, at the very least, there are no issues with respect to interpretation [30] .
Nevertheless it might be quite amusing to study toy universes capable of universal computation, such as Conway's game of life, via intrinsic, embedded, machine learning algorithms. It could not be excluded that these kind of algorithmic agents "come up" with the "right rules;" that is, those rules which define the toy miniuniverse. It can be expected that if a machine learning algorithm performs excellent on particular problems then it necessarily has a degraded performance on the set of all remaining problems [31, 32] .
In any case, the ways how physical theories by human individuals are created is not totally dissimilar from machine learning.
